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Free Trade, Yes; Ideology, Not So Much: 
The UK’s Shifting China Policy 2010-16 
 
Scott A.W. Brown 





Fox and Godement’s (2009) Power Audit of EU-China Relations grouped the EU’s member states 
into four categories based on their national approaches to relations with, as well as their 
preferences for, the EU’s policies towards China. In this typology, the UK, at the time governed 
by New Labour, was deigned an “Ideological Free Trader”—seeking to facilitate greater free 
trade while continuing to assert its ideological position, namely in the areas of democracy and 
human rights. Since the Conservative Party took the reins of power in 2010 (in coalition with the 
Liberal Democrats until 2015), China’s prominence on the UK’s foreign policy agenda has 
arguably increased. This paper examines the direction of the UK’s China policy since 2010, and 
asks whether the label “Ideological Free Trader” remains applicable. Through qualitative 
analysis of the evolving policy approach, it argues that while early policy stances appeared 
consistent with the descriptor, the emphasis on free trade has grown considerably whilst the 
normative (ideological) dimension has diminished. Consequently, the UK should be redefined as 
an “Accommodating Free Trader” (an amalgamation of two of Fox and Godement’s original 
groups—“Accommodating Mercantilist” and “Ideological Free Trader”). 
 
Keywords: UK-China relations, China’s rise, foreign policy, Conservative Party, Cameron, 
Osborne.  
On the eve of his October 2015 UK visit, President Xi Jinping of the People’s 
Republic of China described his hope that the high-level meetings would  
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chart the course for the future growth of China-UK relations, 
inject new impetus in practical cooperation between our two 
countries in all fields and enable us to jointly usher in a 
“golden time” for China-UK comprehensive strategic 
partnership (cited by Reuters, 2015). 
 
British Prime Minister David Cameron was equally enthusiastic in his comments 
during the joint press conference, stating that the visit  
 
marks a key moment in the relationship between our two 
countries. It’s founded on a basic belief, which President Xi 
and I share, that a strong relationship is in the interests of both 
Britain and China. … [T]his visit marks the start of a new era. 
Some have called it a golden era in relations between Britain 
and China, an era of stronger economic ties, deeper trade 
links, closer relations between our peoples and meaningful 
dialogue on the issues that matter to us both (Prime Minister’s 
Office, 2015). 
 
    These statements represent the culmination of a trend towards closer UK-
China bilateral relations, which in many ways reflects the positive narrative 
present at the EU level, regularly defined by policymakers as a “comprehensive 
strategic partnership”.1 Yet, in recent history, the UK and China have not been 
so close, particularly due to the issue of Hong Kong’s retrocession to the PRC in 
1997 and the UK’s strategic proximity to the United States of America. The UK 
was identified by an influential report from the European Council on Foreign 
Relations as one of the few EU Member States willing to push for ideologically-
driven policies towards China, with a willingness to criticise failings in areas such 
as human rights protection (Fox & Godement, 2009). This paper attempts to 
offer insights into the course of UK-China relations by addressing two questions: 
1) to what extent have the Conservative-led governments since 2010 diverged 
                                            
1 The extent to which the EU-China relationship is actually “strategic” is highly questionable, and 
is the subject to frequent academic critiques. Nevertheless, a persistent narrative around the 
“strategic partnership” concept has emerged and persisted within the EU from 2003 onwards, 
reflecting the perception that the relationship is of considerable importance (Brown, 2018: 125-
9).  
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from their predecessors’ approach to China? And 2) to what extent is the 
description of the UK as an “Ideological Free Trader” in relations with China still 
applicable?   
 
    Since the Conservative Party took the reins of power in 2010 (along with the 
Liberal Democrats as junior coalition partners until 2015), China’s prominence 
on the UK’s foreign policy agenda has increased. This paper examines the 
direction of the UK’s China policy since then, and critically evaluates the 
continued utility of the “Ideological Free Trader” (IFT) descriptor as devised by 
Fox and Godement (2009). Through qualitative analysis of evolving policy 
discourse and select government decisions, the argument is that while early 
policy stances appeared consistent with the IFT descriptor, the emphasis on free 
trade has grown considerably whilst the normative (ideological) dimension has 
diminished. Consequently, the UK should be redefined as an “Accommodating 
Free Trader” (AFT, a newly-devised amalgamation of two of Fox and 
Godement’s original groups—“Accommodating Mercantilist” and “Ideological 
Free Trader”).  
 
    The paper aims to make a contribution to the study of UK and EU-China 
relations. While the literature on EU-China relations is still relatively small—
compared to US-China relations, for instance—it has undoubtedly expanded 
considerably over the past decade. While scholars have often recognised that 
member states remain crucial to the overall relationship, there has been a bias 
towards EU-level relations with member states occasionally examined as 
“actors” within the intergovernmental policy processes. Work on member 
states’ bilateral relations with China—even the so-called “EU3” of France, 
Germany, and the UK—are relatively few and far between, with a few notable 
exceptions.2 Thus, there is a discernible mismatch between the insistence from 
scholars that individual member states’ independent/national foreign policies 
cannot be ignored when considering European foreign policy towards China, 
and the actual degree to which these are seriously studied. This paper hopes to 
offer a contribution to bridging that gap.  
 
                                            
2 For instance, Breslin (2004) on the UK; Cabestan (2006) on France; and Heiduk (2014) on 
Germany.  
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    The paper proceeds as follows. In the subsequent section, I outline the 
analytical approach adopted with respect to assessing UK foreign policy towards 
China vis-à-vis Fox and Godement’s (2009) work. Their four categories are 
reviewed to illustrate their analytical utility and foundation in empirical reality. 
This provides the basic framework to examine the extent of change in the UK’s 
case, and map its shift from “Ideological Free Trader” to an essentially new 
orientation. Before we can discuss the notion of a policy shift, we must locate 
the “starting point”, thus the third section draws on the Labour government’s 
2009 China paper, which encapsulated key elements of policy from 1997 
onwards. The fourth section analyses select junctures in the bilateral 
relationship under the Cameron government. Rather than attempting to 
construct a comprehensive analysis of relations, the focus is narrowed to a few 
prominent cases that represent important developments in UK-China and EU-
China relations, as well as significant manifestations of China’s rise—such as the 
militarisation of the South China Sea. The analysis is confined to examining key 
policy actors’ preferences, as we are interested in their motivations behind 
decisions/responses. The analysis demonstrates that the designation of the UK 
as an “Ideological Free Trader” is less appropriate against the background of 
recent policy direction. The fifth section discusses how to best characterise UK 
policy towards China since 2010. The paper closes with a reflection on the state 
of UK-China relations through the first half of this decade, and suggests future 
avenues of research on UK and EU-China relations.  
 
 
Analytical Framework  
 
The analysis rests on examining the policy position of the executive; thus 
domestic disputes over policy—as often aired in the legislatures—are 
deliberately overlooked. This approach will be followed here, as in-depth 
analysis of debates in Parliament or the wider public discourse is surplus to 
requirement and well beyond the scope of the paper. In the UK, the executive 
is paramount in making foreign policy decisions, therefore the views of political 
actors within the various institutions matter the most for present purposes. 
While China pays close attention to Parliamentary debates and activity—for 
instance, it denounced the Foreign Affairs Select Committee’s 2014 inquiry into 
UK-Hong Kong relations as “foreign interference” (cited by Secretary of State for 
Journal of the British Association for Chinese Studies 96 
 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 2015: 23)—this does not alter the fact that 
Parliament lacks the prerogative to change the policies of the UK as a state 
independent of the executive. Thus, I share Fox and Godement’s (2009) 
approach of concentrating on the “official” government foreign policies as 
created by the Executive.    
 
    To focus on the “big picture” of the evolution of the UK’s approach to China, 
the analytical framework is designed with simplicity in mind. Rather than offer 
up a detailed analysis of the policymaking process, only the most relevant actors 
are factored into the empirical cases. It is worth briefly contextualising the 
institutional setting in which this occurs. Dyson (2004: 5) identified the Cabinet 
and sub-cabinet committees—such as the National Security Council—as the 
“primary organizational forums [institutions] for foreign policy core executive 
decision making”. While the Prime Minister has considerable latitude in foreign 
policymaking, they are constrained by the need for consensus within the 
Cabinet on “major foreign policy actions” (Dyson, 2004: 8). Traditionally, the 
Foreign Secretary, leading the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, is the other 
key player within the Cabinet. The Chancellor of the Exchequer—widely 
considered the second-most important position—assumes the central role in 
foreign economic policy, often spilling over into diplomatic and security 
considerations. Consequently, the Treasury has an institutional role to play in 
foreign policymaking, particularly when Osborne enjoyed the informal position 
of Cameron’s “righthand man” (Parker & Warrell, 2015). As shown below, from 
2012 onwards Osborne effectively positioned himself as the key policy 
entrepreneur with respect to China.3 Foreign Secretary William Hague (2010–
2014) appeared largely in the background of many cases below, partly due to 
Osborne’s elevated role but also based on Hague’s level of interest in China. In 
a 2011 interview, Hague expressed scepticism of concentrating attention on 
relations with China alone as an emerging power: “The world is not going into 
concentric blocs of power. … You can't just say we're going to do it all in Brussels, 
Beijing and Washington”, further adding that “Latin America is an economy 
                                            
3 In this article, I follow Mintrom’s (1997: 739) definition of policy entrepreneurs as “people who 
seek to initiate dynamic policy change … [using] several activities to promote their ideas. These 
include identifying problems, networking in policy circles, shaping the terms of policy debates, 
and building coalitions”.  
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considerably bigger than China's and growing almost as fast, and yet we've all 
heard about China” (cited by Rawnsley & Helm, 2011). Hague’s successor, Phillip 
Hammond, took office in July 2014 once Osborne’s policy shift was well under 
way and, so far as the available evidence reveals, did not attempt to wrest back 
control of policy—instead, he appears to have broadly supported the Chancellor 
and PM.   
 
John Fox and Francois Godement, of the European Council of Foreign 
Relations, produced a short but important report entitled A Power Audit of EU-
China Relations in 2009. Their aims were to assess the EU’s performance in 
relations with China and construct an explanation for the failings of the EU to 
leverage its considerable resources to effect positive outcomes in the bilateral 
relationship. They argued that forging a common EU-level strategy was 
problematic due to member states’ variegated responses to China’s rise; this 
produced a situation in which the default was not to challenge China politically. 
Arguably the most important contribution of the report was the creation of four 
categories into which the authors pigeonholed the then-27 member states, 
providing a useful analytical tool for understanding contestation over the EU’s 
collective stance towards China. Despite the fact that no member state had 
exactly the same policy position, they were separated into broad groups defined 
by, essentially, their attitude towards China and labelled as the Assertive 
Industrialists, Ideological Free-Traders, Accommodating Mercantilists and 
European Followers (Fox & Godement, 2009: 4–7). The groups were unevenly 
sized and of differing influence within the EU generally and its foreign policy 
specifically. Most importantly for current purposes, the categories were not 
“fixed” as recent history had shown that member states had shifted out of one 
and into the other following a change of government. Overall, the conceptual 
framework was unique because it was predicated exclusively on national-level 
policy preferences with respect to China rather than broader worldviews, or 
specific national characteristics (identities). That is, the model only applied to 
EU-China relations, and could not be used for, say, EU-Russia relations.   
 
The report was widely read in member states’ capitals and EU institutions, as 
this author learned on previous fieldwork trips in the two years subsequent to 
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the Power Audit’s publication. According to Google Scholar statistics,4 as of June 
2017 the report has been cited in over two hundred publications; a respectable 
figure in the still-niche area of EU-China relations scholarship. Yet, no updated 
Power Audit has been forthcoming from the ECFR,5 nor have other scholars 
critically reflected on the extent to which member states have shifted in and out 
of these groups. This is to the detriment of overall EU-China scholarship, as the 
potential of Fox and Godement’s framework has yet to be fully realised. In this 
paper, the original framework is utilised and adapted to construct an 
understanding of how and why the UK’s policy approach to China shifted quite 
far in only a few years. Before undertaking the analysis, it is worth briefly 
surveying the characteristics of Fox and Godement’s groups to help map out the 
“geography” of member states’ approaches to relations with China.  
 
    Taking the largest group first, the Accommodating Mercantilists (AM[s]) are 
driven by a common assumption that “good political relations with China will 
                                            
4  This was determined through a search on “Google Scholar”; see the results at: 
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?client=safari&rls=en&oe=UTF-8&um=1&ie=UTF-8&lr&cite 
s=9542962397354496225 (accessed June 2017). 
5 Although the Power Audit itself saw no direct successor, Godement et al. (2011) did revisit the 
categories in a paper entitled “The Scramble for Europe”, looking at EU-China relations in the 
wake of the financial crisis and ongoing Eurozone crisis. In this, the original four categories were 
dropped in favour of two new categories: “frustrated market openers” and “cash-strapped deal 
seekers”. The UK was assigned to the former. However, I do not follow Godement et al. (2011) 
as my interpretation is that the new categorisations were far more specific to the context of the 
bilateral relationship during the global financial and Eurozone crises. Arguably, these have lost 
relevance since the worst manifestations of these crises have subsided. As such, the “original” 
groups come back into play, as we need to be able to consider more than just member states’ 
economic positions with respect to China (the two new names were notably economically-
oriented). The Power Audit groups were more comprehensive since all member states (with the 
exception of France under Sarkozy) were categorised. In the 2011 paper, 12 of the 27 states 
were uncategorised—more than were assigned to either of the two new groups; an analytically 
unsatisfactory and unhelpful move if we are to advance the model. Further, when comparing 
“political attitude” (x-axis) across both versions, it’s notable that the main players (the UK, 
France and Germany) and most other states had not changed much over the two-year period 
between the reports, other than a handful of AMs becoming more politically supportive. 
“Economic attitude” (y-axis) demonstrated a greater degree of shift, but because what was 
being measured therein changed (protectionist/liberal spectrum replaced by prioritisation of 
market access in China versus “Chinese deals in Europe”) there is reason to be cautious about 
comparing the two. 
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lead to commercial benefit” (Fox & Godement, 2009: 6). They tend to favour 
protectionist measures to shield their economies from Chinese competition, but 
compromise by broadly avoiding exerting political pressure or overtly 
challenging China on normative issues such as human rights. Fox and Godement 
(2009: 6) claim that “at the extremes, some effectively act as proxies for China 
in the EU”. In short, states belonging to this group are motivated by economic 
self-interest and fail to push the normative agenda, running contrary to the 
assumptions of the Normative Power Europe model which has gained much 
attention in the academic literature (see Manners, 2002). Fox and Godement 
identified France (under Chirac) and Germany (under Schröder) within this 
group, along with Italy and Spain, the two most protectionist states. The 
Ideological Free Traders (IFT[s]), including the UK, are those states “mostly ready 
to pressure China on its politics and mostly opposed to restricting its trade” (Fox 
& Godement, 2009: 6). Their economic interests are served by promoting free 
trade to facilitate cheap imports of goods as China continues to grow, since their 
economies are comparatively less reliant on manufacturing.  
 
    The Assertive Industrialists (AI[s]) comprised just three states, including 
Germany once Angela Merkel assumed the chancellorship. Only AIs were 
“willing to stand up to China vigorously on both political and economic issues” 
(Fox & Godement, 2009: 5). Reluctant to allow economics to drive the overall 
relationship, they are ready to use economic pressure in an attempt to alter 
China’s behaviour. Germany sits in a particularly powerful position as China’s 
main EU trade partner, and at times has attempted to leverage this to obtain 
specific political issues. Fox and Godement (2009) essentially endorse this group 
as having the most desirable approach that should be applied at the EU level. 
The final group were designated the European Followers (EF[s]), those “who 
prefer to defer to the EU when managing their relationship with China” (Fox & 
Godement, 2009: 7). China plays a relatively small part in their foreign policy 
calculations and ambitions; while happy to support the EU position, they are 
generally inactive in policy debates. The group consisted of smaller states that 
look to the collective for shelter from Chinese pressure on politically-sensitive 
issues.  
 
    The prevalence of four different groupings of attitudes towards China has had 
two main effects. First is the impression conveyed to China that the EU lacks 
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unity (Fox & Godement, 2009: 7), curtailing the extent to which the latter can 
realise its ambition of a “comprehensive strategic partnership”. If member 
states cannot agree among themselves on what their strategy should be, the 
prospects for genuine strategic cooperation are inherently limited. This leads to 
periodic “re-bilateralisation” of relations, where the EU states view their 
interests as best served through direct interactions with China, and vice versa. 
This was evident, for example, in the wake of the EU’s “non-decision” on the 
lifting of its Chinese arms embargo in 2005 (Stumbaum, 2009: 165). The other—
and from Fox and Godement’s (2009: 2) perspective, the more troubling—effect 
is that the EU’s policy can be characterised as “unconditional engagement”; that 
is, one that “gives China access to all the economic and other benefits of 
cooperation with Europe while asking for little in return”. This renders overall 
policy ineffective, as the EU is essentially unable to influence China’s behaviour.  
 
Fox and Godement’s (2009) report was a snapshot in time. Their observation 
that both Germany under Merkel and France under Sarkozy “shifted” groups 
opens up the possibility that variation in member state attitudes impact the 
overall relationship. Inevitably, it is “movement” by the members of the so-
called EU3—France, Germany and the UK—that have the greatest potential for 
influencing EU-level policies (see Lehne, 2012). Therefore, scholars of 
European/EU relations with China can utilise the foundation laid by Fox and 
Godement (2009) to analyse bilateral relations. Such studies, while standing on 
their own as contributions to the study of the foreign policy of the member state 
in question, can also feed into further study of EU-China relations. 
Understanding and explaining shifting attitudinal constellations among the 
member states with respect to China may also offer modest predictive capacity 
for how EU policy might evolve, by characterising the policymaking environment 
as more critical versus more supportive in the political domain and more 
economically protectionist versus liberalising. 
 
 
The UK’s 2009 China Policy Paper   
 
To ascertain the degree by which the UK has shifted away from being an 
Ideological Free Trader, it is necessary to show why it earned this designation in 
Fox and Godement (2009). However, detailed historical analysis of the 
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relationship under previous governments is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Rather, our point of departure is the first ever UK policy paper on China, entitled 
The UK and China: A Framework for Engagement (Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, 2009). The document essentially consolidates the various strands of the 
government’s approach from 1997 onwards in one coherent narrative: 
engagement for the benefit of the UK, China itself and the wider world. This 
approach would continue, assuming that Labour were re-elected in 2010. There 
was significant emphasis on economic opportunities from closer engagement, 
but balanced by constant reinforcements of the need to promote human rights. 
There is a notable caveat to the benefits of China’s rise—as then-Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown argued in the foreword that the UK must “get [its] response 
right” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009: 3). This set the tone for the 
remainder of the paper with respect to the need to influence China’s behaviour 
at both the domestic and international levels.  
 
Then-Foreign Minister David Miliband’s contribution to the foreword stressed 
that the promotion of human rights constituted a “fundamental part of this 
Framework, both because it is the right thing to do, and because we firmly 
believe that greater respect for human rights will enable China to manage 
peacefully the internal tensions it will inevitably encounter as it continues to 
develop” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009: 4). Human rights advocacy 
through foreign policy would be achieved by an approach based on engagement 
and cooperation (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009: 4); implicitly 
rejecting an approach based on criticising, disengaging or isolating China for 
human rights failures. Specific outcomes that the UK hoped to see included 
ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
strengthening of the rule of law, greater independence for the judiciary, 
abolition (or reduced usage) of the Re-education Through Labour system, 
reduced application of the death penalty and increased safeguards against 
torture, and increased media freedoms (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
2009: 19). 
      
    The central focus of the paper was economic opportunities: “In a climate 
where restrictions on market access remain, and the process of economic 
reform is not yet complete, we should try to make deeper inroads into China’s 
market. We will help British businesses make the most from the opportunities 
Journal of the British Association for Chinese Studies 102 
 
China’s growth offers” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009: 9). The paper 
outlined objectives of reduced tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, greater 
protection for Intellectual Property Rights, and the deepening of sector-specific 
collaboration, e.g. tertiary education and science (Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, 2009: 15). A broad commitment to a strategy of engagement was 
reiterated in a discussion on bringing China into global governance structures, 
arguing that it was time to bring major international institutions “into line with 
modern realities of power” by reshaping them to ensure that “China’s role … 
reflects its weight and influence” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009: 12). 
This goal of enmeshing China within the status quo international order must be 
met without “undermining [the] norms, or diluting [the] effectiveness” of 
“international leadership structures” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009: 
13).  
 
    Security issues only appeared in relation to prospects for cooperation on 
salient international issues, highlighting China’s increased global influence. 
China’s cooperation would be required to tackle pressing challenges including 
terrorism, nuclear proliferation and conflict prevention/reduction (Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 2009: 8). The document suggested that the two should 
“cooperate to manage regional tensions peacefully” (Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 2009: 11), later clarifying that this included the East 
Asian region but—unsurprisingly—stopping short of identifying China’s rise as 
itself a contributory factor to regional tensions (Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, 2009: 17). Passing reference was made to the need for China to increase 
transparency regarding its defence budget and policy as part of fostering its 
“emergence as a responsible global player” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
2009: 17) but context for the call was missing. In sum, the document matches 
closely with the description of the IFTs as per Fox and Godement’s (2009) 
framework: strong emphasis on the importance of free trade, and an ideological 
component stressing core national values.  
 
    The above is not to say that the UK lived up to the “ideal type” of an IFT at all 
times. Indeed, although policy discourse was peppered with reference to 
human rights and positions adopted were more critical than that of many 
European counterparts, the government’s translation of rhetoric to action was 
often limited. Good economic and political relations dominated, with a 
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tendency to fall in line with the general trend amongst EU states of pursuing 
unconditional engagement. For instance, the UK for a time supported the lifting 
of the arms embargo (contemplated between 2003 and 2005) without attaching 
formal conditions and despite no real improvement in China’s human rights 
record (Brown, 2011). Moreover, it is notable that despite the political 
commitment to the embargo at the EU level, the UK resumed arms and related 
exports to China in 1998, with reports of some $820 million’s worth by 2016 
(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2017). According to the 
Campaign Against Arms Trade’s (2017) calculations, between May 2010 and 
December 2016 the UK government issued licenses for military-related exports 
of £164 million.6  
 
To some extent, this inability to persistently stand up to China is arguably the 
reality—that a country the size of the UK has an inherently limited influence on 
the behaviour of a rapidly-rising economic giant. Despite the former’s 
diplomatic experience and continued political and economic weight in the 
international system, it is not easy to demand change—as even the US could 
attest to. Nevertheless, the willingness of the leadership to raise human rights 
issues at the national and EU levels (when the opportunity arose) and the 
embedded belief that political and economic engagement would facilitate 
Chinese socialisation into Western norms highlights the presence of both 
“ideological” and “free trader” characteristics in New Labour’s policy.  
 
 
China Policy in the Cameron Years, 2010-2016 
 
In May 2010, Labour lost power after thirteen years in government. Unusually 
for Britain, neither of the two major parties secured an outright majority. The 
options were either entering coalition with a smaller party, or governing as a 
minority. After a few days of political wrangling, a coalition agreement was 
forged between the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties with David 
                                            
6 Nevertheless, restrictions have been enforced, with applications for export licenses to China 
refused on the basis of the UK’s international treaty/convention obligations, risk of use for 
internal repression, preservation of regional stability, national security (including that of EU 
member states, allies and other “friendly countries”), and/or the “risk of diversion or re-export 
to undesirable end-users” (Campaign Against Arms Trade, 2017).  
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Cameron (leader of the former) occupying 10 Downing Street. The 
Conservatives, as the major coalition partner, dominated cabinet positions, 
including the Treasury and Foreign Office portfolios. On the surface, the major 
difference of the new government compared to its predecessor was a much 
cooler attitude towards the EU generally. Consequently, the concern with 
driving the EU’s China policy was diminished under the new government, albeit 
the emphasis on greater market access for China persisted.  In this section, I 
explore a series of cases which illustrate the UK’s reaction to the political, 
economic and security ramifications of China’s continued rise. The Dalai Lama 
controversy was the catalyst for the departure from previous policy, highlighting 
Beijing’s increased political and economic clout. The case of the UK signing up 
to the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank represented a decision that is as 
much political as it is economic, while Hinkley Point C and the South China Sea 
represent, respectively, domestic (British) and regional (East Asian) security 
issues.   
 
    In the early stages of Cameron’s government it appeared that continuity 
rather than change was the name of the game with respect to China relations.7 
The Conservative Party’s manifesto had included a few references to China, 
buried deep towards the end of its 119 pages. The prevailing policy approach 
was articulated by the manifesto’s concise assertion that in power they would 
“seek closer engagement … while standing firm on human rights” (Conservative 
Party, 2010: 110). EU-China relations were briefly mentioned, giving support for 
an EU external policy that would contribute to a “strong and open 
relation[ship]” (Conservative Party, 2010: 113). The only specific policy change 
outlined was, to serve a goal of increasing the efficiency of international aid 
spending, that the Conservatives would end aid to China on the grounds that 
their own government (along with other countries, such as Russia) should be 
“looking after their own poor citizens” (Conservative Party, 2010: 118).  
 
                                            
7 Despite the coalition, for expediency I hereafter refer to the “Conservative government” or 
the “Cameron government” for the 2010–2016 period. This is appropriate given the strength of 
the Prime Minister in the domain of foreign policy, as well as the primacy of the Chancellor 
during this period, due to the lack of a formal system of checks and balances based on a codified 
constitution.  
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    Early policy choices and positions staked out on key issues in the relationship 
with China reinforce the validity of the designation as an IFT. Ahead of his first 
official visit to China, Cameron commented that the government was on a 
“vitally important trade mission”, emphasising that “Britain is now open for 
business, has a very business-friendly government, and wants to have a much, 
much stronger relationship” (cited by Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
2010). In a speech to students during an official visit in November 2010, 
Cameron addressed political reform, arguing that he was “convinced that the 
best guarantor of prosperity and stability is for economic and political progress 
to go in step together” (cited by Wintour & Inman, 2010).8 It was reported that 
Cameron also raised individual cases of human rights abuses directly with 
Premier Wen Jiabao, although had justified his approach of doing so behind 
closed doors on the grounds that “we shouldn't be lecturing and hectoring but 
it is right we have a dialogue on these things” (cited by Wintour and Inman, 
2010). When the issue of the arms embargo briefly threatened to resurface on 
the EU’s agenda in late 2010 and early 2011, it was reported that the UK was 
opposed to revisiting the issue (Lohman & McNamara, 2011).9  
 
    The policy shift came after the 2012 meeting between Cameron and 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, and the Dalai Lama, despite PRC 
lobbying efforts. Arguably, this precipitated the lowest point in UK-China 
relations since the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989. China’s reaction was 
nothing new—indeed, it cancelled the 2008 EU-China Summit following French 
President Sarkozy’s meeting with the Dalai Lama—but it was the first time that 
Cameron’s government had been on the receiving end. The plug was pulled on 
Wu Bangguo’s planned UK visit,10 the British ambassador was summoned by the 
government, and Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Hong Lei 
publicly rebuked the meeting, which “seriously interfered with China's internal 
affairs, undermined China's core interests, and hurt the feelings of the Chinese 
people” (cited by BBC, 2012).  
 
                                            
8 This speech was given to a relatively small group of students, with no broadcast or media 
coverage. Consequently, the Chinese government had little motivation to censor Cameron.  
9 Despite continuing to export certain items, as noted in Section 3.   
10 Chairman, Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.  
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    This marked the start of a turning point for the UK government’s approach, 
whereby those who favoured greater political accommodation in order to 
ensure smooth progress in the economic relationship started to win internal 
debates. Based on the publicly available evidence, Osborne was the key policy 
entrepreneur for this school of thought. The Economist (2015) later reported 
“no British politician [was] more closely associated” with the improvements in 
UK-China relations since 2012 than Osborne himself. Osborne stressed that the 
government “made a determined effort to ensure that … Britain is China’s best 
partner in the West. And that has been a conscious decision” (cited by 
Economist, 2015). The shift was evident in early 2013, when reports emerged of 
a split within in the Cabinet, with Osborne and Cameron on one side and Hague 
and Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg (leader of the Liberal Democrats) on the 
other. One Whitehall source summarised the division:  
 
Hague and Clegg … believe we need to stand up to the 
Chinese. For Clegg, human rights are a matter of principle. For 
Hague, it’s about not kowtowing to the Chinese. He believes 
we need to stand up to them, or they will simply treat us with 
contempt. Cameron and Osborne are focused on trade. They 
want to keep the Chinese on side [politically] (cited by 
Oakeshott & Grimston, 2013).   
 
    Despite the events of 2012 and the Cabinet’s internal debates in 2013 
instigating a reorientation of Britain’s approach, the process was gradual rather 
than immediate, with no political fanfare or high-level declaration. The shift 
seemed to go largely unnoticed until 2015, with the exception of human rights 
groups criticising Cameron—ahead of his 2013 visit to China to promote trade 
and investment deals—for agreeing not to meet the Dalai Lama in the near 
future; this criticism was accentuated by an ICM survey revealing that sixty-nine 
percent of respondents thought that “protecting human rights in Tibet was 
more important or as important as maintaining good trade relations with China” 
(cited by Hope, 2013). The next major issue stemmed from China’s 2014 
proposal to establish the AIIB as a means through which to fund its One Belt, 
One Road (OBOR—or New Silk Road) initiative.  
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    The significance of the AIIB is twofold. One, it represents the manifestation of 
China’s increased confidence to exercise both political and economic power to 
further its aims—effectively a form of soft power. If successful, the AIIB will 
increase China’s international influence through economic incentives for 
participating states. It may also enable China to challenge “dollar hegemony” 
(Holmes, 2015). Two, it arguably signals China’s willingness to operate outside 
the established international economic order—rather than turning to existing 
institutions, a new one was created. The move then plays into debates over 
whether China is a status quo or revisionist power. Certainly, numerous 
commentators picked up on the fact that the Obama administration appeared 
to view the AIIB as a direct challenge to the US-designed (and backed) 
institutions (e.g. Subbachi, 2015). Others saw the institution—and the divergent 
responses in Europe and the US—as a strategy designed to divide the West (e.g. 
Le Corre, 2015). The UK government apparently did not share these pessimistic 
interpretations; in March 2015, Osborne announced the UK’s intention to 
become a founding member of the AIIB, proudly declaring that it would be “the 
first major Western country” to do so (HM Treasury, 2015a).   
 
    While the announcement was warmly received in China, the tone of the 
reaction in the US was remarkable for its bluntness. Ostensibly, the UK had given 
no prior indication of its intentions, and the Obama administration took issue 
with a key ally committing to joining an institution that it saw as a challenge to 
its own power, even after direct appeals to allies—including the UK—not to join 
(Higgins & Sanger, 2015). The subsequent rush of other European actors to sign 
up to the AIIB, lest they miss out on the opportunity, further reinforced US 
concerns. Somewhat unusually, the US National Security Council issued a 
statement about the UK’s move to The Guardian, noting that it “is the UK’s 
sovereign decision” but urged the British government to “push for adoption of 
high [governance] standards” similar to those of the World Bank and other 
regional development banks (cited by Watt et al., 2015). There was a parallel 
concern among US officials that the AIIB was effectively a tool for increasing 
China’s regional soft power (Watt et al., 2015). One senior official was quoted 
as lamenting the fact that the UK’s announcement was preceded by “virtually 
no consultation”, and added that there was wariness regarding “a trend toward 
constant accommodation of China, which is not the best way to engage a rising 
power” (cited by Dyer & Parker, 2015). Eswar Prasad, formerly head of the IMF’s 
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China division told The Financial Times that “apart from gaining favour with 
China it is not immediately obvious what the UK interest is in joining this bank” 
(cited by Anderlini, 2015). 
 
    The negative reaction to the AIIB decision was largely external. However, 
Osborne’s September Xinjiang visit and President Xi’s October state visit caused 
analysts, commentators and the public to sit up and take notice of the 
accommodating nature of UK policy. Osborne’s goal in Xinjiang was to enhance 
economic ties and state support for the One Belt, One Road initiative. In an 
opinion piece—co-authored with former Goldman Sachs economist Lord Jim 
O’Neill—published in The Guardian just before the visit, the Chancellor’s 
perspective on China relations was clearly set out: 
 
There are those who say we should fear China’s rise—that we 
should somehow guard ourselves against it. But we reject such 
thinking, which would simply leave the UK slipping behind. 
Instead, we should embrace it. We want a golden relationship 
with China that will help foster a golden decade for this 
country. It is an opportunity that the UK can’t afford to miss. 
Simply put, we want to make the UK China’s best partner in 
the west (Osborne & O’Neill, 2015).  
 
    At home, Osborne received criticism from human rights activists for failing to 
raise the issue of increased repression in the region. Sophie Richardson, Human 
Rights Watch’s China director, asserted that a failure to publicly raise human 
rights issues would demonstrate “how craven and cowardly UK policy towards 
China has become” (cited by Phillips, 2015a). Activists’ concerns appeared to be 
validated by government statements around the trip; an HM Treasury (2015b) 
press release on the first day of the visit did not mention the ethnic violence in 
the region or human rights concerns more broadly. Pressed on the issue, 
Osborne told BBC Radio’s “Today” programme that he would not engage in 
“megaphone diplomacy”, and argued that the UK would help with the economic 
development of the region (cited by Phillips, 2015b). Later during the trip, he 
told foreign journalists that in his view it would be “very strange if Britain’s only 
relationship with one fifth of the world’s population and the government that 
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represents them was solely about human rights … [but it] doesn’t mean we 
don’t stand up for our values” (cited by Phillips, 2015b).    
 
    Xi’s state visit the following month was the first of its kind in a decade, and 
was described by the British government as “a spectacular celebration of our 
shared appreciation of heritage and culture” (Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, 2015). In addition to the diplomatic dimension, there were economic 
incentives behind the visit. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2015) 
identified commercial agreements across the “creative industries, retail, 
energy, health and technology, financial services, aerospace and education” 
sectors. Cameron called it “a very important moment for British-Chinese 
relations … a real opportunity to deepen our relationship” (cited by Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 2015). Of the issue areas listed on the government 
website for discussion, China’s human rights record and actions in the South 
China Sea were not listed. Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond’s comments 
ahead of the visit identified the opportunity to “ensure that China’s emergence 
is done in a way that ensures she respects the rules-based international system 
and works with the grain of the international community to be, and to remain, 
a responsible player on the world stage” (cited by Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, 2015).  
 
    Criticism of the portrayed closeness of the relationship with China quickly 
mounted up in the national and international media. The Financial Times framed 
the visit as “the moment when the existing global hegemon’s closest ally bent 
its knee to the rising superpower” (Anderlini & Parker, 2015). The speaker of the 
House of Commons, John Bercow, remarked that India was a “great democracy” 
following an MP’s comment that the government should treat both great 
powers the same way (cited by Dathan, 2015). Such political statements in this 
manner from the speaker are rather rare, and garnered considerable attention 
given the implicit criticism of China’s regime. Cameron’s own former adviser, 
Steve Hilton, characterised the government’s behaviour as “humiliating” (cited 
by Parker, 2015). Elsewhere, Fabian Hamilton MP (Chair of the All Parliamentary 
Group on Tibet) stated that the UK should not allow China “to get away with the 
kind of human rights abuse that our government seems so eager to ignore in 
the name of economic growth” (cited by EuroNews, 2015). Supporters of Tibet 
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and the PRC even clashed on the streets of London upon Xi’s arrival (Islam, 
2015).  
 
    Cameron was quick to counter his critics, arguing that he “totally reject[ed] 
the idea you either have a conversation about human rights and steel or you 
have a strong relationship with China … you can have both, indeed you must 
have both” (cited by Parker, 2015). He also claimed that he raised human rights 
issues behind closed doors, although his aides would not disclose specifics 
(Parker, 2015). The government largely went on the defensive throughout the 
visit and thereafter, with Hammond denying that the UK was in a 
“master/servant” relationship with China (cited by Islam, 2015). Irrespective of 
these assertions and what may have been said behind closed doors, the overall 
impression was that the red carpet had been rolled out for the Chinese 
President. There was a concerted effort to present the image of a “friendly” 
personal relationship between Cameron and Xi with a pint at the pub and a 
“selfie” with Sergio Aguero of Manchester City Football Club. The front page of 
The Spectator’s September 26 issue—published ahead of the visit—depicted 
Cameron and Osborne kowtowing to a Chinese emperor, and asked: “Where’s 
the morality?”11 The cover served as a graphical representation of the extent of 
criticism that Cameron and Osborne received from across the political spectrum 
for their open-armed approach and ostensible political accommodation in 
return for economic gain.  
 
    Out of the October 2015 visit came one of the UK government’s more 
controversial decisions: the solicitation—and eventual approval—of Chinese 
investment in the development of a new nuclear energy power station. The final 
deal saw France’s EDF commit to building the station, to be part-funded by 
China General Nuclear (France24, 2016). The controversy largely focussed on 
China’s involvement, with critics citing concerns over security, particularly the 
prospects for China to gain develop insights into—and potentially exploit—
weaknesses in critical infrastructure. Caroline Baylon of Chatham House stated 
that “if the international situation changes [with respect to the unspoken 
agreement between nations not to target each other’s infrastructure], the UK 
                                            
11  The image can be viewed at http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/files/2015/09/dal.jpg (accessed 
10.06.2017).  
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may find itself in a tricky spot if this Chinese deal goes through. Today’s alliances 
are not tomorrow’s alliances” (cited by BBC, 2015a). In the same report, 
unnamed defence and security sources were concerned over the prospect of 
“trapdoors or backdoors” being built into the computer systems designed by 
the Chinese company, facilitating the bypass of security measures if ever 
needed (BBC, 2015a). Despite these warnings being communicated to the public 
via the media, the government actively played down the concerns, instead 
concentrating on the economic and energy-related benefits.  
 
    Osborne justified the decision to facilitate Chinese investment in the UK’s 
civilian nuclear infrastructure through appealing to the British taxpayer; he 
referred to the decision as a “concrete advantage for British people” of the close 
bilateral relationship. As Chancellor, he did “not need to stump up billions and 
billions of pounds of taxpayers’ money to build a new nuclear power station … 
money I can’t then spend on the health service or can’t then spend on the 
education system or can’t use to cut taxes” (Osborne, cited by Economist, 2015). 
Osborne apparently had little regard for either the potential security 
implications or, it would seem, how the public, the media, or the UK’s 
international partners might perceive the decision, even after the recent 
criticisms levelled at his policy approach. Treated in isolation, the decision could 
be argued to be relatively innocuous; however, placed in the wider context of 
China’s increasing assertiveness at that time (see below), then the decision 
arguably represents further accommodation when the UK’s main strategic 
partner—the US—was increasingly concerned about China’s actions.  
 
    The South China Sea disputes (SCSDs) —and the international community’s 
response to China’s assertive actions and uncompromising political position—
arguably represents the clearest case of the challenge of integrating a rising 
power into the Western-led, rules-based international system. China is involved 
in long-running disputes with its neighbours pertaining to sovereign territorial 
claims within the South China Sea (SCS). The contestation for territorial control 
is deemed worthwhile for access to natural resources (oil and gas) and fisheries, 
and of course, national pride (Lunn & Lang, 2016: 5). Trade routes through the 
SCS are also important: some $5.3 trillion in total trade passes through annually, 
and 90% of Middle Eastern fossil fuel exports are projected to go the Asian 
region by 2035 (CFR, 2016). Therefore, there are economic and political factors 
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at play. The fine details of the disputes are beyond the scope of this paper, but 
the most salient aspects can be distilled: China asserts historical claims of 
sovereignty of territory far from its own coast, bringing it into dispute with 
Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. In order to bolster their 
claims and assert their “sovereignty”, all but one (Brunei) have occupied at least 
some of their claimed islands, establishing a (para)military presence there (Lunn 
& Lang, 2016: 6). Controversially, since 2013, China has “engaged in 
unprecedented and ecologically devastating dredging and island-building” in 
the Spratly Islands, creating “more than 3,200 acres of new land” (Asia Maritime 
Transparency Initiative, 2016a). Upon these new artificial islands, China has 
apparently been constructing military bases, despite claims from the 
government that they are for civilian purposes (Sanger & Gladstone, 2016). The 
militarization of the SCS is viewed as a potential flashpoint for conflict between 
the disputants, as well as facilitating China’s ability to project power throughout 
the region (CFR, 2016).    
 
    Although the UK lacks a regional presence in any meaningful sense, it 
nevertheless remains an interested party due to its permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council and its considerable economic stakes in continued freedom of 
navigation, which some are concerned is under threat due to the increased 
militarization of the SCS and China’s increased assertiveness in the region. As an 
IFT, the UK would be expected to uphold the international status quo and insist 
on adherence to international law precisely because the current arrangements 
continue to deliver benefits. The US, the principal status quo power, has 
repeatedly made clear that it will not accept China’s aggressive approach to the 
SCSDs and insists upon continued freedom to navigate through contested 
waters. Despite the conventional wisdom that the UK largely backs the US in 
foreign policy matters, the Conservative-led government in the UK has been 
relatively quiet on the SCSDs, only offering statements with more direct 
language when prompted to do so by others or under the cover of multilateral 
settings, for instance within the G7.   
 
    The most revealing statements from government officials are found in the 
Parliamentary record. In December 2015, Minister of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs Hugo Swire responded to a written question regarding 
whether the UK had a view on, specifically, China’s maritime claims. Swire noted 
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that the UK “takes no position on the underlying and conflicting claims” and that 
it advocated the peaceful resolution of maritime disputes “in accordance with 
international law, for example [UNCLOS]” (Parliament, 2015a). The Minister of 
State for the Armed Forces, Penny Morduant, replied to a written question on 
whether the Royal Navy would adhere to China’s proclaimed territorial limit 
around the Spratly Islands with confirmation that British ships would “exercise 
the right of innocent passage whenever transiting in another States' recognised 
territorial seas” which would require “neither prior authorization nor 
authorization from the coastal State” (Parliament, 2015b). In March 2016, Swire 
responded to a question on the SCSDs during a parliamentary debate, 
reasserting these principles. He added that the government was “concerned 
about the risk that some of the large-scale land reclamation … could pose to 
maritime freedom of navigation and to the area’s stability” (Parliament, 2016). 
Importantly, Swire only expressed “concern”, and did not articulate a 
preference for cessation of the reclamation activities. While it can be inferred 
that the concern stems from China’s activities specifically, this was not explicitly 
stated. By contrast, President Obama had previously called on China to “halt 
reclamation, new construction, and militarisation of disputed island[s]” (cited 
by BBC, 2015b). Consequently, the UK has adopted a non-confrontational 
approach on this issue, apparently unwilling to directly challenge China on the 
political front, and crucially, unwilling to offer rhetorical support for the position 
of the US.   
  
    Cameron’s willingness to stand up to China on political matters appeared to 
return in May 2016 when, at the G7 Summit in Japan, he called for compliance 
with the upcoming tribunal ruling from the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 
The Hague, arguing that China should be encouraged “to be part of [the] rules-
based world. We want to encourage everyone to abide by these adjudications” 
(cited by Asthana et al., 2016). According to coverage in The Guardian, Cameron 
had “adopted his toughest stance yet on China’s claims, following criticism from 
the White House that he has been too accommodating towards Beijing” 
(Asthana et al., 2016). Yet Cameron called on all sides to respect the outcome, 
and purposefully avoided taking a side on the competing claims. Thereafter, the 
government largely avoided making further, independent statements on the 
upcoming tribunal ruling, despite the US looking to its allies to take a firm 
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stance. By the time the ruling was made in July 2016, Cameron was no longer 
Prime Minister.   
 
    Theresa Fallon (2016) argued that “China’s economic statecraft has softened 
the resolve of some EU member-states and groomed them to advocate Beijing’s 
position” on the SCSDs. Fallon (2016) noted that the language in the EU’s 
collective response to the arbitration tribunal failed to take a strong position, 
only acknowledging the outcome, not supporting or welcoming it. The main 
opponents of a stronger position were Greece, Hungary and Croatia—although 
we can infer that the UK, France and Germany were not desperate for one 
either, for they could have brought their weight to bear and pushed forward. 
Essentially, China hoped for EU neutrality on the SCSDs. Here then, it is not just 
a case of the UK accommodating China—and indeed there were more egregious 
examples from other EU states. However, the evident unwillingness of the UK 
to take an assertive position and call on China to respect the ruling, as the US 
had and hoped its allies would, conforms to the general drift away from its 
ideological approach towards accommodation. In the context of the UK having 
voted to leave the EU—although still formally a member state until official 
withdrawal—there was arguably scope to start asserting its own voice on the 
international stage, had the government chosen to do so.  
 
 
From “Ideological Free Trader” to “Accommodating Free Trader” 
 
Fox and Godement (2009: 7) observed that with respect to the competition 
between the major EU states for the title of “partner of choice”, China typically 
only granted “preferred status for a limited duration offering its favours to the 
highest or most pliant bidder”. Thus, if the UK’s recent overtures on the political 
and economic fronts were orchestrated to position it as the new favourite, at 
best the results would be of short-term benefit,12 but potentially costly in terms 
of the negative reactions in the domestic and international contexts. Breslin 
                                            
12 Arguably, the EU referendum outcome may prove to diminish China’s interest in the UK given 
that it will no longer be able to influence overall EU China policy. However, even in the situation 
whereby the UK had voted to remain in the EU, its boosted reputation with China would still be 
subjected to the same patterns of recent history—short-term favouritism which encourages 
competition from France and Germany.  
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(2004: 409-410) noted that some observers saw New Labour’s early approach 
of promoting economic relations while attempting to maintain an “ethical” 
foreign policy centred on human rights as essentially contradictory; however, 
the counterargument rested on the belief that engaging China and integrating 
it with the established international order would facilitate change in domestic 
policy over time—this national-level engagement strategy was largely in tune 
with the positions adopted by other EU member states during the 1990s.  
 
    As with Fox and Godement’s (2009) observation that both Merkel and Sarkozy 
had substantially shifted the approach of their respective country’s policy 
towards China, the UK underwent a similar—although less immediate—
reorientation following the Conservatives replacing Labour in government. 
Thus, the characterisation of states as “Ideological Free Trader”, 
“Accommodating Free Trader”, or any other designation must be caveated with 
the realisation that these are not fixed identities. The interesting difference in 
the case of the UK’s reorientation was that rather than the head of government, 
it was in fact another policy entrepreneur, Chancellor Osborne, who was in the 
driving seat. Ultimately, Cameron, as PM, held constitutional power over foreign 
policy within the Cabinet as the core executive and could have effectively 
“vetoed” Osborne, but appeared to have been sufficiently persuaded by his 
colleague to support the new approach. Osborne was critical of the failure of 
the preceding government to capitalise on economic opportunities, 
complaining that “we woefully failed to connect Britain to the growing Chinese 
economy in the previous decade” (cited by Economist, 2015). In the interview, 
The Economist’s Bagehot columnist queried the UK’s role in democracy and 
human rights promotion; Osborne’s response largely dodged discussing these 
issues directly, instead focussing on the fact he was engaging China in an 
“economic and financial dialogue” and was personally interested in “Britain 
projecting itself abroad” (cited by Economist, 2015). According to one source 
familiar with Osborne’s views, he was “convinced that the UK strategy is right 
and that the US is wrong” (Anderlini & Parker, 2015).  
 
    In terms of material circumstances changing, a question remains as to exactly 
how economically important China was for the UK during the timeframe of 
analysis. The data on UK-China trade over the 2006-2016 period shows that 
exports and imports have increased (Table 1). Although lagging behind UK-US 
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trade and comparatively small compared to UK-EU trade, China is nevertheless 
an important trading partner for the UK already. Osborne’s rhetoric emphasised 
the potential for even greater economic relations on the basis of its continued 
growth (both in terms of overall GDP and the wealth of its expanding middle 
classes). Compared to 2006, by 2016 UK exports to China had more than trebled. 
By comparison, exports to the US only increased by approximately ten percent, 
and exports to the EU had in fact shrunk. Imports from the US and China were 
virtually level in 2016.  In 2015, one report projected that British foreign direct 
investment in China would quadruple by 2020 (Burn-Callander, 2015). During 
his September 2015 visit to Chengdu, Osborne hailed the “unprecedented 
opportunity to secure significant [Chinese] investment into some of our most 
ambitious projects” (cited by Giles & Plimmer, 2015). The potential for 
attracting investment is evident, when China’s FDI outflows increased by an 
average of thirty percent annually from 2005-2015 (Hanemann & Huotari, 2017: 
4). Between 2000 and 2016, the UK was the top European destination for 
Chinese FDI, attracting over €23.6 billion—in the same timeframe, Germany 
attracted over €18.8 billion (Hanemann & Huotari, 2017: 10). Even so, Osborne 
continually pressed that the UK could—and needed—to do better. This 
impacted his policy preferences, which Cameron enabled him to translate into 




    The trend in the UK’s foreign policy orientation towards accommodation is 
not irreversible; a crucial point here is that the prevailing views of actors 
(particularly policy entrepreneurs) within the foreign policy core executive can 
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strongly set the course for how the country interacts with China. This is true for 
the other EU member states, as shown by Fox and Godement (2009). This 
perspective rejects the notion of the “fixed” national interest to which all 
policymakers are relentlessly working towards. It also demonstrates the 
limitations of assuming that interests are exogenously determined by the 
structure of the international system or contingent on the behaviour of third 
parties. China’s policy towards the UK did not change significantly during the 
2010-16 period—rather, it continued to press its case for greater access to 
British/European markets and retaliate to any perceived criticism of its domestic 
behaviour towards its own citizens or offences to its international character 
(such as the Dalai Lama being granted high-level meetings). Thus, calculations 
of interests and perceptions at the individual or group level can result in rapid 
policy shifts.  
 
    Indeed, although the new Prime Minister, Theresa May, has been in office for 
less than a year at the time of writing (June 2017), there are indications that her 
government may push the UK back towards the IFT grouping. It is too early to 
draw any firm conclusions, with few interactions to analyse; rather 
unsurprisingly, the May government is preoccupied with other, arguably more 
pressing issues, not least the UK’s impending departure from the EU. However, 
early signs suggest a different approach to her predecessor. May initially 
delayed the final approval of the Hinkley Point cooperative deal, citing security 
concerns. The delay was defended as necessary to address outstanding security 
concerns. In the end, however, May relented and signed off on the agreement, 
but gave no clarification as to whether her concerns had even been resolved, or 
what steps would be taken to ensure national security or assurances from China 
(if any). Indeed, the delay lasted for just seven weeks, which does not appear to 
provide much scope for tackling the complexity of questions around protecting 
critical infrastructure while allowing the close practical involvement of a state-
backed Chinese enterprise. Nevertheless, the very fact that May was willing to 
publicly declare that the government harboured security concerns was a 
marked departure from Cameron and Osborne. 
  
    On the SCSDs, the UK has not shifted stance and continues to align with the 
rest of the EU. This would be one area where the UK could actually demonstrate 
its “difference” from the EU—supposedly one of the goals of those who 
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advocated leaving the Union—and shore up its strategic partnership with the 
US by recalibrating its policy and rhetoric. In July 2016, the tribunal ruled on the 
SCSDs following the Philippines’ request for arbitration over China’s claims. The 
court can only enforce its rulings through “international pressure”, thus “how 
many countries recognize the decision as legally binding on both parties and call 
for it to be respected will determine its ultimate value” (Asia Maritime 
Transparency Initiative, 2016b). Prior to the ruling, the UK—along with the other 
EU states—had supported the tribunal, arguing that it would be legally binding 
and that both sides must respect the outcome (Asia Maritime Transparency 
Initiative, 2016b). However, at the time of writing, the UK has yet to join the 
ranks of those—including the US—issuing public calls for the outcome to be 
respected. Had the government done so, this would more clearly signal a return 
to a more assertive stance on political issues. Instead, the primary response 
came from the High Representative, in a statement on behalf of the EU and its 
member states that acknowledged the ruling but did not explicitly push for 
China’s compliance. The policy line that the EU does not “take a position on 
sovereignty aspects relating to claims” was reiterated and the involved parties 
were urged to resolve the dispute through peaceful means and “in accordance 
with international law” (Mogherini, 2016). Missing from the statement was an 
endorsement of the final ruling as legally binding (Asia Maritime Transparency 
Initiative, 2016b). Still, it is relatively early days since the ruling thus it would be 
premature to definitively claim that the UK’s position will remain unchanged.   
 
    A final point with respect to the UK’s status within the EU at present: the 
decision to leave the Union does not necessarily undermine the rationale of 
looking at its China policy through the prism of Fox and Godement’s (2009) 
typologies, or variants thereof. Until the UK and the EU finalise the withdrawal 
process, it remains a full member and therefore an active participant in the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy framework, even if its ability to influence 
EU policy towards China is considerably diluted. It is reasonable to suggest that, 
even after “Brexit”, there will be much need for the UK and EU to cooperate on 
foreign policy. It is possible that something akin to an “EU+1” policy sphere may 
emerge due to overlapping interests and shared history. The exact nature of the 
new political relationship and forms of cooperation in “external” relations 
remains to be determined by the Article 50 negotiation process. Even if this 
results in effectively zero cooperation in foreign policy, the UK will still be 
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interested in pursuing free-trade arrangements with China, and will continue to 
make decisions on whether or not to inject ideological concerns into the political 
dimension of the bilateral relationship. In short, even outside the EU, we can 
still meaningfully talk about the UK as an Ideological Free Trader, 
Accommodating Free Trader, etc. A question which further research should 
address is whether Brexit—when it finally happens—correlates with a 
reorientation of British foreign policy towards China. Moreover, as Kerry Brown 
(2016) pointed out, in China’s “strategic thinking, the UK will figure as a far less 
important partner than it has hitherto”; thus, how the PRC orders its priorities 
with regards to engaging with the EU and UK will be an interesting feature 





At the outset, I established two questions to be pursued through this paper. 
Here, I will briefly recap my argument in relation to these, and then consider 
how further research might build upon the analysis. First, the Conservative-led 
government between 2010 and 2016 diverged from its predecessor’s approach 
to China mainly in terms of adopting a more politically accommodating stance. 
This emerged in the wake of China’s repudiation of Cameron for meeting the 
Dalai Lama in 2012, and thereafter the government revised its mode of 
engagement to avoid upsetting the PRC. This fostered an environment in which 
the UK could pursue economic relations largely unrestrained by ethical 
concerns. Although previous governments had sought good economic relations 
at the expense of sticking to a principled or ethical foreign policy at all costs, 
Cameron’s government arguably took this further than ever before. Kerry 
Brown (2013) commented that Cameron’s “journey from human rights 
champion to business pragmatist has been spectacular”. The political approach 
moved the UK into close proximity with its EU counterparts, while on the 
economic dimension, it continued to promote free trade. Thus in answering the 
second question, the “Ideological Free Trader” descriptor for the UK is no longer 
applicable; instead its behaviour is more accurately encapsulated by designating 
it as an “Accommodating Free Trader”. 
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    Further research will of course be required to ascertain whether this persists 
through the premiership of Theresa May and once the UK has left the EU. It is 
possible that this shifting approach may simply reflect the policy preferences of 
key players confined to the Cameron government between 2010 and 2016. The 
early evidence from PM May’s government is inconclusive; the relatively quick 
decision to finalise the Hinkley nuclear deal without making further ado about 
security concerns may indicate continuity over substantive change. On the 
South China Sea dispute and associated international ruling, May resisted taking 
a more forceful line. Future research could be broadened out to examine the 
trends in policy direction of other EU member states, and test the extent to 
which Fox and Godement’s (2009) original categories remain useful tools of 
analysis. Further down the road, researchers could look into how the EU’s 
approach to China changed following “Brexit”, and the extent to which it 
enabled the UK to pursue a more distinctive policy, as envisioned by key 
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